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Mats Alvesson  and André Spicer 
 





Why do professionals surrender their autonomy? In this paper we look at the case of 
academics, in particular business school academics. We trace how this group of 
professionals have progressively surrendered their autonomy and complied with the 
demands of managerialism. We argue this has been reinforced through coercive forms of 
power like rewards and punishment and bureaucratization; manipulation and 
mainstreaming through pushing a particular version of research to the top of the agenda; 
domination through shaping norms and values; and subjectification through creating new 
identities. We note this process was not all encompassing. It often entailed academics 
having to dealing with tensions and paradoxes such as compliance and resistance, as well as 
love of work and loathing of it. To deal with these paradoxes, academics often treat their 
work as a game and see themselves as players. While process enables academics to 
reconcile themselves with their loss of autonomy, it has troubling collective outcomes: the 





It is often claimed that professionals are difficult to manage. This is because they are 
autonomous, self-governing and have stronger loyalty to their profession than their employers. )t frequently said that managing professionals is like Ǯherding wild catsǯ 
(Löwendahl 1997:63). The Rector of a Swedish university some years ago gave a talk with some emotion emphasizing that Ǯthe organization need to be improved. We must make sure that decisions are implememented. )n canǯt be so any longer that decisions are treated as arguments in a debateǯ. This tradition of debate still tends to dominate in many universities. 
Academics ask for good arguments, not instructions on how they might perform better in a 
measurement exercise. Most academics, even in business schools, claim that they do their 
work out of love (Clarke et al 2012). Instrumental concerns seem to come second. 
 
Professionals, we are told, value autonomy. There are many examples of professionals 
surrendering their autonomy in the face of managerial change agendas. It has happened in 
health care as management systems have been imported from automobile manufacturing to 
control the workflow of doctors. It has happened in the law as traditional partnerships have 
become corporations. Now even priests are being sent on management training courses in 
business schools. In each of these cases, there have been ongoing skirmishes. But on the 
whole many professionals seem to have surrendered their highly values autonomy. Why?  
 
One striking example of this process can be seen in the universities.  If there is one group of 
professionals who are suppose to value autonomy very highly, it is academics. But in the last few decades many academics have very Ǯflexibleǯ when it comes to this virtue. Sure, 
there are frequent complaints about the loss of autonomy. Some savvy academics have 
made a career doing this. But, on the whole, many academics have complied with 
managerial diktats and the creeping emphasis on instrumental rewards. This stands in 
stark contrast with traditional understandings of academics as difficult to manage. How 
come there has been so little resistance and so much compliance? 
 
This quandry is wonderful captured by Slawomir Magala (2009), who points out that most 
academics have trapped themselves with professional bureaucracy which severely curtail 
their autonomy. They comply with this system in the pursuit of the promise of upward 
mobility. Yet they want to maintain a fantasy of themselves as radicals who identify with 
the underdog. To keep this fantasy alive, they organise fringe conferences and academic 
meetings to discuss avant guard cinema, dissect post war European philosophy or stage 
theatrical events they have penned. They may play at being radical, but they almost totally 
compliant in their day to day work. How did this happen?   
 
In this paper we try to answer this puzzling question by looking at instances when 
academics comply with new forms of managerial control. In particular, we explore how 
academics working in business schools have enthusiastically complied. To explain why this 
happens, we argue it is necessary to consider the role of power. We argue that all four face 
of power – coercive, agenda setting, ideological and discursive – seem to be at work in 
driving academics to comply with the current managerial regime. But what is particular 
interesting is that this compliance is not straight forward. It is riddled with paradoxes such 
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as compliance and resistance; love of academic labour and cynical loathing of it. To cope 
with these paradoxes, academics begin to see their work as a game which can be played. 
This game involves not just strategic compliance with the rules of 'research' (Butler and 
Spoelstra, 2012), but a kind of gaming of different positions. When this happens, apparently 
autonomous professionals can get so tightly bound up with the playing with power 
relations, they stop think outside the game, they avoid asking questions and they just 
enthusiastically comply.    
 
By pointing out how professionals surrender their autonomy through dynamics of gaming, 
we hope to make a number of contributions. First, we add to the growing literature looking 
at conditions of work for professionals in business schools (eg. Clark and Knights, 2014). 
We build on the observations that many critical management scholars see their research 
work as a kind of game (Butler and Spoelstra 2013). We point out this has much wider 
application, and helps to explain how people can willingly relinquish their autonomy in the 
face of increasing managerial demands. Second, we add to the wider debate about growing 
managerialism within the university sector as a whole and the broader implications this has 
for professional autonomy (eg. Magala, 2009; Collini, 2012). We do this by drawing 
attention to how academics have not just been forced to comply with managerial demands – 
in many cases, they have actually been willing and sometimes very enthusiastically. Third, 
we also hope to make a wider contribution to the ongoing debate about the control of 
professionals (e.g. Alvesson and Kärreman 2004). Over the last decade or so, this literature 
has largely highlighted the role which identity regulation plays in this process. Building on 
what we – and indeed others have observed – we think it is worthwhile considering how 
professions can be controlled through gaming. Finally, we think there are some important 
practical implications of our argument. We think it is necessary to think through double-
talk (scorning REF and managerialism while smoothly complying with it) which seems to 
play a role in the current capitulation to increasingly excessive managerial demands. Simply 
producing ever louder denuncations of the latest managerial initiatives is unlikely to be 
enough. We think what is needed is a degaming of academics.  
 
To make these contributions, we start with some observations of how business schools 
downplay the objective of offering good education and intellectual qualifications and 
instead focus on other purposes, like helping students to fake their ability to employers ȋǮemployabilityǯȌ. We then point out how managerialism have become increasingly 
dominant at universities. As a result, the purpose of scholarship (meaningful knowledge) 
has given way to maximize publication possibilities. We then argue this can be explained by 
looking at the combination of various forms of power dynamics. We note these different 
power dynamics can create some interesting paradoxes. We then highlight how academics 
deal with these paradoxes through treating them as 'game' which needs to be 'played'. We 
conclude by noting how this push towards gaming might be challenged. 
 
The Managed University  
 
The increasing importance of management and the impact which this has on universities - 
and the academics who work in them - is not difficult to miss (Collini, 2012). What was once 
thought to be an institution with its own logic, rituals and administrative tradition has come 
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to increasingly resemble any other (over) managed organisation. Academics have found 
themselves working in professional bureaucracies which promise upward mobility through 
compliance with ranking systems (Magala, 2009). Universities are now replete with many 
of the similar 'management innovations' which are common in large corporations: they 
have quality control systems, performance measurement, branding initiatives, marketing 
and communication units, strategy exercises, visionary leaders, hedging strategies and 
alliance building initiatives. This strong belief in and widespread use of systems, 
procedures and initiatives driven by managers we refer to as managerialism.  
 
What to make of all this divides opinion. For some this is a step in the right direction. All 
these managerial initiatives address the inefficiencies and sloppiness of a field which has 
been sleepy for too long. According to enthusiasts, by adopting modern management 
practices, universities can begin to more effectively deliver on their mission. Quality 
initiatives like the UK's research excellence framework, some claim, have played a central 
role in transforming many universities from academic sleepy backwaters into cutting edge 
global centres of excellence.  
 
For others, the rise of managerialism in universities is a problem (e.g. Collini, 2012). Critics 
point out how the rise of management metrics has seen the decline of traditional values 
which had underpinned the university. Scholarly virtues such as the pursuit of truth and 
meaningful and important intellectual contributions are under threat. These changes is 
thought to be fuelling a longer term decline in the quality of education students receive, the 
amount of path breaking research being created, and a degradation of standards of work in 
academia.  
  
Irrespective of the side one takes, there still seems to a mystery here. Instead of putting in 
place new management systems because they will help to deliver important objectives, it 
appears many university managers adopt new practices for what are often the most 
superficial reasons (others are doing it, it will make us look world class). What is more the 
over-adoption of these ideas often takes up significant resources which could go into 
delivering on the core missions of the university. What is even more surprising is that most 
academics typically respond with a kind of passive distain: they think the ideas are stupid, 
yet they are willing to cynically 'play the game'. This means managers and academics exist 
in an embrace characterised by perceived managerial stupidity on the one hand and 
professional cynicism on the other. 
 
These same academics often remain more or less complicit with the process. Sometimes 
this comes in the form of active complicity such as when a professor suddenly lends their 
support to a managerial initiative. However, this is only a fairly limited part of how 
academics respond to managerialism. What is much more common is cynical complicity. 
This happens when academics think protest will do no good, or will suck up precious time 
which could be used for doing more pressing things, i.e. fostering their careers. The result is 
vociferous complaint are often matched with a practical acceptance of an apparently woeful 
state of affairs. The question that any academic who wants to maintain a lustrous self image 
(and that is most) must answer, is how does one square one's own intellectual commitment 
to reason, critique and other fine characteristics with one's own practical commitment to 
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what they think is a stupid system?  
 
Four by Four Factories 
 
One of the most obvious terrains on which this cynical compliance appears to be at work is 
in the part of the job that many academics see as being most meaningful: research. There 
has been a movement from more pluralistic approaches to research (where a wide range of 
forms of research were seen as appropriate) to a myopic focus on publishing in highly 
ranked journals. The numbers of journal articles published by a researcher and the level of 
the journal in which they appear has moved from a modest issue to a major concern. For 
some it has become almost the only concern. Having something important, relevant and 
meaningful to say seems to have become comparatively less important than doing and 
publishing research that appears in the right journal.  
 
The over-riding focus on journal publications has been reinforced by reward systems. In 
recent years, it has become common to promote people with little breadth of achievements 
but a few publications in the right journals to professorships. Some schools throughout 
Europe offer hefty bonuses (in the tens of thousands of Euros) for publication of articles in 
top ranked journals. Publishing articles in a handful of highly ranked journals has become seen as the only way new academics can secure a relative stable job at a Ǯgoodǯ institution. 
The flip-side of rewards for publication is an increasingly harsh punishments – or at least a 
fear of  sanctions –for those who don't perform on these narrow criteria. For instance, 
Martin Parker's (2015) account of Euro Business School (EBS) reports how 'at least one 
member of staff who was deemed to be failing on ABS terms was paid a considerable 
amount of money to take severance, also subject to signing a confidentiality agreement. The 
fact that he also happened to have won every teaching prize that EBS and the university 
offered appeared not to matter' (p. 286). On the other hand, the mass industry of higher 
education and in particular business schools call for an army of lecturers of which the 
majority have nor will not have articles in highly ranked journals – so there are many, in 
particular lowly ranked institutions employing people with a mediocre research record. 
    
Still, the construction of the ideal and norm of Ǯeverybodyǯ needing to publish in ranked 
journal dominate and there is some reality behind this. Many UK business school academics emphasize that only journal articles Ǯcountǯ, and that books and other writings are not 
rewarded. An over-riding concern for many academics is the ǮͶ by Ͷǯ formula - publishing 
four journal articles in journals which are ranked as four star by list like the Association of 
Business Schools. Often this is not something held at distance by academics. Instead it can be experienced as a deep indicator of oneǯs excellence. )n many cases, one's performance 
becomes a currency for overt status displays. As one senior British management academic put it on email list: ǮI wish I had a fiver for every time I've heard academics say 'I've got x number of Ͷ star papersǯ. 
 
Turning universities into '4 by 4' factories may be an efficient for organising knowledge 
production. It certainly has financial advantages for many people. Having a system to create 
accountability, a 'fair' distribution of resources and ensure academics produce something 
with the time they are given to do research is reasonable. Producing four good 
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contributions to knowledge in seven years also seems to be a reasonable demand. Peer 
assessment based on a combination of the format of the publication and reading texts 
sounds also fine.  
 
Despite the fact that many of the features of the over-arching assessment system seem 
entirely acceptable, it is increasingly evident that it may be backfiring. Instead of improving 
the 'excellence' of research produced by academics, it may be having exactly the opposite 
effect. Many of the outcomes which this system has produced seem doubtful. One often 
hears about how much of the research which is currently produced by business schools 
lacks broader relevance and offers little in the way of interesting or innovative new ideas. It 
has become common to complain how the papers in the highest ranked journals are 
generally uninteresting and irrelevant (eg. Willmott, 2010; Grey, 2010; Alvesson and 
Sandberg, 2013). The only reason anyone has to consults this work is when they themselves 
want to write an article for a similar journal (Gabriel 2010). This presumably creates a tight 
circle of bored writers reading boring articles so they can write yet another boring article 
for other writers that need to look at these for their literature reviews. Perhaps many 
scholars would have preferred much the work they are expected to be familiar with and 
refer to not to be written at all so they would not be not be forced to read it in order to 
demonstrate their knowledge of the literature in the subfield.  
 
One of reasons why reading journal articles can be so unappealing is that they have become 
documents of discipline. Rigorous compliance with standards is far more important than 
having something interesting or relevant to say. This is because the format of leading 
journals is similar to bureaucracy (Alvesson and Gabriel, 2013). To be sure, increased 
bureaucracy creates many positive things: clear guidelines and rules, standardization of 
work, increased efficiency, development of specialized skills, smooth and predictable 
evaluation processes, the elimination of nasty surprises and anxiety limitation. But 
increased focused on formulaic papers has created many of the dysfunctions of 
bureaucracy: limited imagination and creativity, predictable products, a bureaucratic 
writing style, strong sub-specialization, the (over) exploitation of a limited 'competence', 
the evaluations based on tick-box processes. When researchers feel constrained by different 
rules and standards, they tend to play it safe by imitating what others have done – so called 
gap-spotting (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2013). All this limits the chances of unexpected, 
challenging and surprising ideas. As a result, articles in leading journals score high on rigor 
and incremental contribution, but they fail to say very much which is novel or make a 
strong social impact (Bartunek et al. 2006; Clark & Wright 2009).  
 
We have produced a system where a reworked version of Winston Churchill's famous 
soundbite would seem apt: never before in human history have so many had so little to say 
to so few.1   
                                                          
1 When Alvesson originally used this phrase at a large phrase in a panel discussion at EGOS, it received 
spontaneous applause from an audience of over 300 people. It clearly seemed to resonate with the mood in the 
Organisation Studies community in July 2015. Perhaps the phrase was made even more prescient because the 
conference was being held in Athens during a week when the banks were closed and tens of thousands of people 
were protesting on the street every evening. If you looked at the overwhelming majority of papers being 
presented, you would see little sign of the fact that many European economies were in deep financial crisis. This 
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Given this sad state of affairs, we should not be surprised at increasingly cynical comments 
make about their own field such as 'In general I see very few people doing work they think 
important for anything but the tenure and promotion treadmill' (senior academic), or 'there 
are more unqualified people pumping more crap into more unread outlets than ever before 
in history' (retired academic). Despite this fury, there seems to be kind of resigned 
acceptance that, in the words of one academic writing on an email list, 'the only thing that 
seems to count for every faculty is the churning out of endless streams of publications' 
(senior academic). The extent of this resignation is well captured by another UK based 
academic, who pointed out that:  
 
'League-table-ism is not up for negotiation. As Aesop nicely points out for us, 
well, for me at least, the archer is entirely indiscriminate and has absolutely no 
regard for the eagles or the scrawny feathered among us, but we ourselves 
seemingly have no genuine collective will or even anything close to a shared 





What is surprising for us is not that the current bureaucratization of research has produced 
increasingly irrelevant and uninteresting research. We all know bureaucracy is boring. 
What is more puzzling is the strong over-adaptation to this system by academics 
themselves. One would expect that there might be a balance between the demands of 
journal system on the one hand and academic values on the other.2 The journal system has 
many advantages but as with all systems it needs to be balanced with cultural orientations 
supporting good judgement, professional integrity and a strong sense of what is meaningful 
and relevant. This does not seem to have happened. Many academics have practically 
surrendered traditional academic values in favour of commitment to the discipline and 
instrumentalism of the journal system. As a result, a system aimed at measure and reward 
quality has been turned into a system of concertive control which academics enforce on 
each other (Barker 1993). The excessive focus on journal and journal lists may have been 
pushed from above by senior management keen on easy metrics. But it has also been enforced from Ǯbelowǯ by the academic community itself. We would like to ask how has this 
happened? Why is it that resourceful people who are supposed to be driven by a strong set 
of shared values, intrinsic motivation and are traditionally considered to be difficult to 
control have become compliant and (self)disciplining enforcers of a system they themselves 
think – or at least often say – is stupid? Or perhaps rather functionally stupid, i.e. is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
strange disconnection between scholarship and reality was bought to a head during the evening conference 
dinner which was held on a finely manicured athletics fields half way between two huge street protests. When 
the protests ended, many of the activists passed by the athletics field and starred at the conference goers, who by 
this time were dancing to middle of the road music. The whole scene resembled an upscale summer wedding 
party.     
2 An incomplete list of these in no particular order might include: Developing interesting and valuable knowledge, 
publishing one's work in a variety of format, emphasizing work and ideas rather than outputs, seeing intrinsic 
motives as more important than instrumental outcomes (like a pay rise and promotion) 
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disinclination to carefully consider meaningfulness or relevance or engage in critical 
reflection  (Alvesson & Spicer 2012). 
 
We think that existing ideas about power and control in organization studies may provide a 
useful guide to answer these questions. We will consider the interplay between four faces of 
power which are commonly found in organizations: coercion through hierarchy, 
manipulation and mainstreaming through agenda setting, domination through shaping 
accepted ideas and values and subjectivation through shaping accepted sense of self 
(Fleming and Spicer, 2007; Law 1978; Hardy 1994). In what follows, we look into each of 
these faces in some more depth and explain how they have driven (over) compliance.  
 
Coercion through Hierarchy 
 
During recent decades there have been marked structural changes in the higher education 
sector. A central aspect of this has been marketization. Initially, this was driven by 
international competition and recruitment of overseas students. However, successive 
governments have raised student fees for nationals and changed policies to allow private 
providers into the sector. Over time this has created a fully fledged market in university 
education in some countries like the UK. 
 
In addition to increasing market pressures, Universities have found themselves under intensifying pressure to complying with other Ǯinstitutionalized mythsǯ ȋMeyer & Rowan 
1977). To win wider legitimacy, they have to conform with widely shared assumptions 
about what a good organization should look like. This often involves emulating practices 
which can be found in other organisations. Some examples include showing they have 
strategic visions, human resource management systems, branding functions, are addressing 
diversity and so on. All this creates a pressure to add new functions to the university. 
 
Marketization and the demand to comply with an every expanding range of institutional 
myths has driven a rapid expansion of administration in universities. Recent statistics show 
that administrative staff now outnumber faculty at over half of the UK's universities (Jump, 
2015). At the London Business School, administrators make up 85% of the total employees. 
One U.S. based academic recently released a book in which he warned about the rise of the 
'All administrative university' (Ginsberg, 2012). In it, he documents how between 1985 and 
2005, the number of students in US universities had grown by 56%, the number of faculty 
increased by 50%, the number of administrators has grown by 85% and the number of 
administrative assistants grew by 230%. Looking at the difference between public and 
private universities is instructive. In public universities, the number of administrators grew 
by 66%. The figure was 135% in private universities. Contrary to popular belief, the level of 
bureaucratization of the public sector as a whole has actually increased with the 
marketization of sector (McSweeney 2006; Graeber, 2015). Indeed the institutions which 
are most exposed to market pressures (ie. Private sector institutions) also have the most 
bureaucracy (in the form of administrators). This reflects a continued de-emphasis on core 
practices in favour of managerialism, looking good and imitating others (and adopting a lot 
of functions irrelevant or even undermining good research and education). 
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The growth of administration has gone hand-in-hand with the increasing power of 
managers. A large managerial infrastructure has developed to control the expanding 
numbers of administrative staff. There has been a multiplication of academics mainly doing 
managerial work. One piece of evidence around this is the expansion of Deans in many 
universities. In his study of US academia, Ginsberg (2012) documents the expansion of the 
what he calls 'Deanlets' and 'dealings' – people appointed to associate or assistant Dean 
positions for all sorts of things from student experience to social media. As the number of 
managerial positions has expanded, the role of 'collegiate control' by the faulty of decision 
making has decreased. In an increasingly familiar account, Parker (2015) documents how 
the new Dean of one UK business school eliminated the entire committee system and 
centralized decision making power around himself. As a result most checks and balances to 
the Dean's power with the business school were eliminated. This left the Dean free to 
pursue increasingly strange courses of costly activity.  
 All this means that academic control is being significantly weakened. The rise of Ǯacademic managerialismǯ means Deans now have legitimacy and formal power to make decisions 
about faculty activities based on research output. However these same Deans are in turn 
measure on the basis of various national or global standards – such as research rankings. In 
the UK for instance, many Deans and Vice Chancellors have parts of their pay tied to the 
performance of their institutions in the national research auditing exercise. They often do 
not necessarily approve of being exposed to what may be seen as competition and ranking 
based on simplified and arbitrary measures that invite manipulation. Non-the-less, they feel 
that they need to adapt (Sauder & Espeland 2009). In one UK business school, the Dean 
often begins his speech to various audiences by pointing out that he is a Statistician, so he 
knows how statistics can be made to lie. He then goes on to run through the various 
statistics showing the good performance of the school on a range of metrics.  
 
Academics are by no means innocents. Deans have become dependent on what can 
sometimes be a small group academics who are deemed to be highly productive according 
to the criteria which many Deans distrust but nonetheless go along with. This reinforces the 
status and power base of those deemed to be high-performers. This at times small group 
has been able to transform their power into favorable conditions (such as lower teaching 
loads, plentiful conference budgets, no administration etc) and higher pay. This often means 
that what is seen as the academic elite are often disinclined to undermine managerialism – 
as they can sidestep many of the disadvantages and profit from the privileges of the system.  
 
Manipulation and Mainstreaming through Agenda Setting 
 
The various ranking exercises have placed issues of research performance close to the top 
of the agenda in many Universities. This can be easily observed by the amount of time and 
resources which is spent on these issues – up to the highest levels of universities. In the past 
research was something which was discussed in the seminar room. During the past two 
decades, it has entered into the committee room in a big way. Indeed, there has been an 
explosion of discussion about 'research' and an expansion of the range of administrative 
forums (such as committee meetings) for this discussion to take place. 'Research' has 
become an increasing item for hallway discussion and gossip in universities. Within 
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scholarly communities there has been a curious shift in focus with the explosion of 
workshops focused on issues like 'how to publish', 'how to win grants' and 'how to achieve 
impact'. What is so striking about many of these discussions is that they are not about the 
actual content of the research as such. Instead, they focus on the more formalistic elements. 
For instance, during informal discussions, you can easily talk to a colleague about research 
for hours, hear long lists of names of journals and precise impact factors, but hear nothing 
about the actual content on the research which they are doing. Author biographies in 
journals are often dominated by a list of the journals in which the author has published.     
 
All this highlights that 'research' (and a very particular formalistic definition of research 
which can be found in various ranking systems) has become a key agenda item. Challenging 
this agenda – for instance, by bringing up the harm a strong focus on journal publication in 
highly ranked journals can have - seems difficult. This is because the credibility of the 
existing agenda is, despite all the critique, fairly strong. Although many attribute this to the 
increasing strength of managerialism in the university, there is also a strong element of 
community control at work. Academics choose to talk incessantly with one another about 
their performance in research assessment activities. They have also played a role in pushing 
'research' (in particular the formalistic elements of it) up the agenda of University 
committees. And after all, why wouldn't academic staff want to advance the importance of 
'research' on the university's agenda? It is something which they are told incessantly is the 
most important, meaningful and rewarding part of the job. This all lends a certain degree of 
legitimacy to the whole issues which makes it difficulty to argue against.  
 
One way which those aiming to resist the formalistic 'research' agenda do so is through 
publishing journal articles pointing out the problems. As a result, there is an expanding 
body of journal publications in highly ranked journals which question the emphasis on 
journal lists, the current journal format, and so on. This is, of course, a glaring paradox here. 
You try to critique a form by using the very form which you are questioning. In some 
spheres of life this might be a very clever and subverse move indeed. In the business school, 
it is just another chance to add a line to the CV. Such attempts at resistance fuels the very 
institution which they are supposed to challenge and undermine. We should here add that 
we, the authors of this paper, is as guilty of this as many others. (We do, however, also work 
in other ways – internally within our institutions and in public debate to create changes in 
higher education.) 
 
There are certainly other attempts to challenge the 'research' agenda. These may come in 
the form of attempts to reformulate the constitution of the agenda item (what counts as 
'research'), or re-prioritise other agenda items (such as teaching, administration, public 
engagement etc). Often both these processes can prove to be difficult. A person who tries to 
question the priority of research might risk being marginalised as low-performers 
(according to 'research' based criteria) and therefore lacking credibility to challenge 
existing arrangements. Those who do benefit from current arrangements are probably 
going to be rather disinterested in changing an agenda they benefit from. In such contexts, 
credibility and motivation to complain usually contradict each other.   
 
Domination through shaping Norms and Values 
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Most academics at least claim to loath strict regimes for assessing and thereby controlling 
their work. It is common to hear doubts about journal ranking lists, the REF, the '4 by 4' and 
so on. In fact, expressing these doubts is an important part of ongoing informal social 
interaction in UK universities. Such research assessment procedures are commonly seen as 
a manifestation of broader neo-liberal ideology within academic life. What is interesting is 
how this wider neo-liberal discourse is dealt with. Most actors do not find neo-liberalism 
particularly convincing on an intellectual level. Indeed, there are many academics who have 
made fine careers critiquing the failings of neo-liberalism. However, what is particularly 
interesting is how academic relate to this set of ideas. Anger seems to be matched with 
resignation. At least in the UK, neo-liberalism has progressively marginalised all other 
political discourses (such as social democracy and conservativism) during the past three or 
four decades. This has lead UK academics to resigning themselves to it within their own 
professional sphere. They feel that all the battles have been lost, and they are not going to 
be won within the university. A routine script has become 'we know we are defeated, so we are quiet from the startǯ. Defaitism rules. This helps to legitimize compliance: it starts to be 
viewed as rather intelligent to adapt and be realistic. This leads to and legitimizes an ǯideology of opportunismǯ: it is good to be realistic, to adapt conditions and be loyal with 
colleagues and institutions in manipulations so we will look good in assessments and 
rankings. 
 
Although there may be a defeatist acceptance of neo-liberal ideas in Universities, there are 
other ideas which have been most positively and wholeheartedly embraced. These are often 
professional values which appeal to peak performances, elitism and Ǯexcellenceǯ. There is 
also the lure of academic celebrity. Being known, being read and being influential is clearly 
a central concern. High status knowledge has an international appeal. Cosmopolitianism 
ideologically outscores local orientations.  
 
Alongside the allure of being seen as part of an international elite, there is also the appeal of 
some idea about accountability. Having considerable discretion and ample time to do 
research is strongly valued. This calls not just for a laissez-faire approach but a clear 
delivery of something that is perceived as a knowledge contribution. The quality check of 
the peer review here fits nicely. And it is very difficult to find an alternative to this. A boss 
review, pal review or a self-review are all inferior to the peer review for quality control, 
accountability, feedback and resource allocation in academia.  
 
Grandiosity is also valued by academics. Expectations and demands are rising. More and 
more people want status and identity confirmation. Within post-affluent society and their 
accompanying culture of narcissism, there is a strong orientations towards rapid careers 
and more impressive titles (Alvesson 2013; Foley 2010). One place this can be see in 
Universities is the explosion of the number of Professors. During the 1970s, there were 
4,000 Professors in the UK. Now there are nearly 20,000. Promotions seem to more common in business schools than in many other areas. )n UK during the ͳͻͺͲǯs, leading 
academics could be lecturers for extended periods and expect promotion only after making 
significant contributions. Today, people with modest records of achievement expect much 
quicker progress, in particular in business schools. Some older staff members we have 
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spoken with claim it is probably easier to become a professor today than a senior lecturer 
25 years ago. This signals and reinforces an ideological shift from more intrinsic values 
towards instrumental values like careerism, titles and wages. Most academics still express a 
degree of love for their work and its intrinsic value. However the increased salience of 
instrumental aspects reduce the importance of intrinsic aspects (Salancik & Pfeffer 1978). 
We have moved from meaning to motivation (Sievers 1986), from what is important and 
meaningful to what is being rewarded.  
 
 
Subjectification through Shaping Selves  
 
The fourth key ingredient in the surrender of autonomy entails changes in how academics 
see themselves. An important aspect of this is the strange seductiveness of rankings, 
performance measurement and similar systems. What is so striking is that whilst academics 
are often unhappy, or even downright critical of these techniques, they also embrace and in 
some cases even revel in them. This can be clearly witnessed in a typical account of the REF. 
Usually such accounts start out by expressing disdain and pointing out the problems with 
the system. Then they switch to outlining the speakers own personal performance – or 
perhaps the performance of their institution. This creates a rather strange double think 
whereby academics both claim to loath the control system which they find themselves 
subjected to and also measure their own self worth in terms of it. In a sense we here have 
an outsourcing of meaning (Magala 2009), from associated with work to what is being 
evaluated and rewarded by others. 
 
Such a compromised position might be seen as an outcome of a gradual process. Entering 
the Business School context itself often is seen to require certain compromises on the part 
of some academics. Here is how one Professor, with a critical/sociological orientation, puts 
it: ǯAlthough perhaps changing now, many/most UK b-school professors - myself 
included - in some way started their academic careers by making a compromise or 
perhaps even in their own minds 'selling out'. The compromise, of course, was to work 
in a b-school in the first place rather than in a 'proper' subject field, perhaps in one of 
the social sciences (though also in some cases maths, history etc). So perhaps in 
having made this first compromise, we are then more willing and more adept at 
making further compromises. Perhaps we say to ourselves that 'we may as well be 
hung for a sheep as a lamb'. Perhaps we imagine that we we will only compromise so 
far and no further but because the process of compromise happens gradually we 
never recognise when we have reached, or crossed, that line. Perhaps also we are 
resistant to recognising our compromises since we are innured by our first sell-out. 
Well, this becomes rather speculative of course, but the underlying fact of the background of UK faculty is not speculative even if its consequences are.ǯ3 
                                                          
3     Studies report that academics in economics are more inclined to maximize self-
interest compared to their colleagues in humanities, social and natural sciences (Frank 
et al 1993). Presumably, business and management people often have a similar 
orientation as their colleagues in economics.  
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What is striking here is the contrast which is set up between the apparent purity or at least 
superiority of 'proper' disciplines (social science, history, maths are all mentioned) and the 
intellectually sullied space of the business school. Having to move from a more 'pure' object 
of identification (a proper discipline) to a much more questionable one (the business 
school) is experienced as the 'first sell-out' which may be followed by more.  
 
There are further elements to this process of subjectification: publishing is often not just a 
form of intellectual work – it becomes a kind of identity work (Alvesson & Willmott 2002). 
When measured on the basis of outcomes, we find our naked and exposed self at stake. We 
are even more vulnerable when outcome are crystalized through a numerical system and 
put on public display through something like Google Scholar. When this happens research 
publications start to be seen by oneself – and indeed others - as reflecting personal qualities 
such as intelligence, creativity, scholarship, efficiency, and commitment. This is exacerbated 
by the fact there is an element of choice involved in academia: People to a high degree 
choose their topic, research question, method, writing style, collaborations and where they 
attempt to publish their work. This means their work can be experienced as being more of 
an individual outcome. Named authorship which directly ties the work to the researcher 
further underlines this. As a result, publication becomes a way of working up a positive 
image of who you are. Failure to publish becomes not just a work issue, it becomes a wound 
on your self. 
 
This creates a close to one-to-one relationship between a research outcomes (such as 
journal publications) and their sense of academic self. Although research depends on 
collective efforts, builds on tradition and is strongly influenced by feedback, it is 
nonetheless experienced as profoundly individual in nature. The identity regulatory effects 
of journal publishing and the entire process leading up to this becomes very strong. To see 
this, all you need to do is to take a look at the short biographies which academics include at 
the end of a publication. Usually, they spend half the space presenting themselves in terms 
of which journals have they published in. The narrative lurking behind this appears to be: I 
am the journals in which I have published in. Perhaps we are not far away from a situation 
where instead of listing degrees and professional qualifications after one's names, 
academics will start listing their publications. When this happens, academics might hand 
over business cards which read like this:  
 
Max Manageman. (ASQ, AMJ, AMR, OS, JMS, HR).  
Research Professor.   
 
Developments in technology are likely to further ratchet up public displays of achievement. 
Easily available information such as citation rates, H-scores and much more have created 
extremely high level of transparency and visibility. Within a few clicks, you can find a 
researcher's Google Scholar profile and assess their relative worth by looking at their H-
score (even if you know absolutely nothing about their field). At many institutions now, 
when potential faculty are interviewed, the panel are given documents assessing their 
research performance using metrics such as the H-score. Some scholars have tried to 
smooth this process by just including their citation rates and H-scores at the top of their CV. 
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Maybe the next step will be just to write your H-score on the badge each academic wears at 
conference. In this way, everyone will instantly know whether you are worth talking with 
or not.  
 
Yiannis Gabriel (2005) uses the metaphors of glass cage and glass palace to illuminate these 
kinds of hyper-transparent organisations. For him, these are organizations which are 
characterized by incessant visibility and constant surveillance. This arrangement, he points 
out, prompts a kind of exhibitionism where the occupants of transparent cages always put 
themselves on show and making a spectacle out of themselves. In the academic glass cage, 
your research outputs are rendered constantly visible – for all to see. But what is even more 
fascinating is that instead of waiting for authorities to see and assess them, many academics 
seem to scream out to be seen. To gain attention, they make a research spectacle out of 
themselves - constantly displaying their outputs in a way which is there for all to see. New 
technologies such as social media make this task much easier.  
 
In Sum: Juggling Scripts  
 
The four faces of power we find at work in academic life overlap and reinforce each other. Coercive power such as commands from Deans to Ǯpublish or elseǯ do not work on its own. 
It could easily lead to powerful resistance. Direct instances of power need to be linked with 
a robust agenda around 'research' which is strongly supported by notions such as 'research 
excellence'. In addition these values need to be linked in turn with strong forms of identity 
regulation and identity work. Perhaps the most interesting aspect is how this entire system 
has become so efficiently self-regulated and has seems to have largely produced complicit 
and committed participants who incessantly tell each other – and themselves - to focus on Ǯwhat countsǯ: publishing in high ranked journals.  
 
This produces selective neglect. Large swathes of academic life are overlooked. Teaching 
becomes seen as something to be avoided if possible and is often passed onto junior faculty 
or teaching-only staff. Administration becomes seen as a pesky interruption to be passed off 
to those with an interest in such matters. This of course creates perfect conditions for the 
further concentration of power and the dissolution of process of collegial control.  
 
As well as creating neglect, the myopic focus on 'research' has also generated significant 
effort. Researchers plow thousands of hours their lives into 'crafting' articles for 
submission, dealing with reviews, networking and much more. In most cases, it means the 
academic working day extends far into the night. And what is the result of this great labour? 
A constant flow of articles, which are judged by an increasing number of academics to be 
pointless technical exercises which are uninteresting, make little in the way of real 
contribution and have no impact beyond marginally on a small group of specialists. 
 
However, this is not just a story of overwhelming compliance. As we have already indicated, 
there seems to be constant shuttling between enthusiastic compliance and bitter complaint. 
At one moment the research complains about the unsavory effects of the overwhelming 
focus on research. The next moment, they are heading back to the desk for a long session 
working on their next journal article. An important part of this habitus seems to be the 
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ability to combine resistance and compliance; the romantic love of academic labour and 
cynical suspicion of it in the very same gesture. The question we would like to ask in the 
next section is how it is possible to combine these paradoxes demands.  
 
Playing the Game  
 
Academics – like other people working in complex settings – must be able to dealing with 
contradictions and paradox (Magala, 2009). They should be able to shuttle between 
compliance and resistance; a romanticised love of their labours and a cynical suspicion of 
them. Each position offers a well established scripts. When speaking from the compliant 
script, they claim 'I am (or hope/want/expect to be) a 4 by 4 person'. Then the resistance script comes out, and the line becomes: Ǯ)'m against this whole system, )'m only pretending to comply.ǯ The romantic script claims: ') love my work'. And the cynic finishes it off by 
sneering: 'I see through all the crap'. 
 
Holding fast to one of these scripts leads to difficulties. Relentless compliance can turn you 
into a clone. Constant resistance can create big push back from authority figures. Always 
being romantic about your work can break your heart. Cynicism can dry up the last ounces 
of belief. To avoid these problems, academics learn to juggle different scripts. The well 
adapted person can blend and balance. They can express one attitude in an academic 
seminar while discussing a paper, another in a department meeting when looking at 
performance metrics, a third in the pub as they complain to a colleague, and something 
entirely different when they are at home offloading onto a spouse. Such blending and 
juggling scripts is tough. How exactly do academics cope?  
 
We think an important way to help juggling these contradictions is to see work as a 'game' 
and see oneself as player. If you listens to even just a small sample of academics talking 
about their work and the pressures which are put upon them, you will be struck by just how 
frequently this metaphor is used. A recent study of UK academics found gaming to be a 
commonly used metaphor. Producing journal publications for the REF was seen as 'playing the game'. Butler & Spoelstra ȋʹͲͳʹȌ conclude that ǯmany of our respondents admitted that 
they put a great deal of work into tailoring their paper to the meet the expectations of editors and reviewers.ǯ ȋp ͺͻͶȌ. They also suggest that the game tends to master its players, 
rather than the other way around. Some commentators say that management scholars Ǯnow have more capital in gaming skills than in scholarshipǯ ȋMacdonald and Kam, ʹͲͳͳ: Ͷ͹ʹȌ  
 
Why is it that self-declared critics are so fond of such a frivolous metaphor when talking 
about their 'calling'? Perhaps the central advantage is that by seeing themselves as a 
'player' who participates in a 'game' one is able to develop some kind of distance and 
reduce one's commitment to any particular script. You don't need to be completely 
compliant or resistant. Nor do you need to be either utterly romantic or thoroughly cynical. 
All you need to be good at is playing the game. If you are a player, you can put aside any 
serious questions about the contradictions which you face. Instead, you can focus on honing 
one's skills at playing the game. What is even more striking is that by seeing the whole 
undertaking as a game, a professional can imagine that they are not at all reducible to the 
game. Instead they are somehow apart from it or superior to it. They can also harbour the 
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fantasy they can step away from the game and leave when they might want.  
 On the face of it, Ǯplaying the gameǯ seems to be what many people do. )t allows them to 
preserve some energy, commitment and perhaps their sense of self for other things. Playing 
indicates a pragmatic response, not any deeper compliance to any particular script. 
Moreover, it can help to preserve the idea that beneath or beyond player there is a non-
playing self.  Academics can also legitimize their own involvement and compliance by 
pretending that they really 'see through it all' and therefore have an autonomous standing 
on the subject matter (Fleming & Spicer 2003; Kunda 1992) 
 The idea that you are Ǯplayingǯ adds a dimension of awareness: it feeds the idea that the 
player stands above the game and are not a sucker. Instead they exhibit a meta-understanding. Butler & Spoelstra ȋʹͲͳʹȌ, for instance, point out that ǯCritical management scholars therefore Ǯplay the gameǯ at the same time as they condemn its rule or lament its consequencesǯ ȋp ͺͻͺȌ. The successful person playing the game smoothly interacts with 
performance management and is rewarded accordingly. Yet they also are able to distance 
themselves from this by doing a fair amount of identity work which bolsters a sense of self 
that is not too blemished. The game playing romantic who engages in a little minor 
resistance and lots of compliance seems to be the formula for success.  
 
The game playing metaphor may appear as an entirely subjective response, but it needs to 
be understood in relationship to other forces of power. The game is not chosen, but imposed by hierarchy and agenda setting. These forces offer rules and constraints. ǮYou have to …ǯ is part of the metaphor. )t is a game you are forced to play. These rules, however, 
are constructed as somewhat flexible and soft, for the game player. Of course, people donǯt 
say 'play the game' if they face or fear loosing their jobs. Ideologies offer strong cultural 




In this paper we have addressed the issue of how academics, more specifically business 
school academics, have responded to the rise of managerialism. There is, of course, much 
variation, but compliance seems to be a common, if not, dominant response. We think this is 
rather unexpected. One would assume that a high status group with a strong work 
commitment would be difficult to change. In fact it appeared to be quite the opposite. The 
growing body of research on business schools suggests many academic have been active 
(although not particularly willing) participants in the process. We see this as a mystery, and 
we have set out to ask why.  
 
To begin to address this mystery, we turned to work on power. In particular, we argued that 
the (un)conditional surrender of professional autonomy can be explained by looking at the 
role which power plays. Clearly exercises of coercive power in the form of increasing 
managerial hierarchy, the use of incentives such as bonuses for publication and increasingly 
punitive punishments for 'non performance' have been important. But this would not have 
worked if it wasn't backed up by a particular conception of research rising rapidly to the 
top of the agenda of both formal and informal discussions in universities. This has been 
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further underpinned by a defeatist acceptance of neo-liberal ideas, which are then 
combined with other 'traditional' academic values such as competition, excellence as well 
as a wider desire for grandiosity. All this was made personal as research work has morphed 
into identity work. It has been further reinforced by new technologies which can 
immediately make ones research performance visible. 
 
However, this is not a straight forward story of compliance. Through-out we have noted 
that academics seem to shuttle between apparently opposites: compliance and resistance, 
love of academic labour and cynical loathing of it. To manage this complex identity juggling act, many academics see their working lives as a Ǯgameǯ which needs to be 'played'. This 
creates a certain distance from the often very difficult roles which they have to take on. 
Perhaps this makes the constant juggling a little easier to bare. It also makes things easier 
for their organizations to manage their employees. The only problem is that it has created a 
glut of research which is uninteresting and says little of significant to a larger audience. 
 
What this suggests that if we are indeed serious about creating scholarship which is both 
more interesting and more engaging, then simply demanding academics start being 
interesting and engaging is unlikely to work. Instead, we need to look at the deeper power 
relations at work within universities that reproduce much of uninteresting and irrelevant 
research. Of course there is a need to change rewards and punishments to ensure 
academics are encouraged to produce work which goes beyond a narrow list of journals. 
Writing research-based texts for a larger audience seem vital. There is also the need to 
rethink the increasing creep of managed bureaucracy within universities which has in turn 
produced much bureaucratised research.  
 
Interventions need to go beyond these obvious aspects. There are also needs for a re-
evaluation of the official and unofficial agenda within universities. This might involve asking 
whether putting 'research' (or at least a certain vision of it) near the top of university 
agendas is actually doing research any good. Is it actually creating lots of talk about 
research and less action? Furthermore, we may need to revisit some of the deeper values 
under-giring research activities. For instance is a defeatist attitude still warranted? Should 
other values be revived beyond 'academic excellence', or should these core values be 
revived in different way?  
 
Another pressing question is whether the current kind of identity work which is so closely 
attached to publication is actually very healthy. Does it create mindless research robots? 
Ineffective resistors? Heart-broken research lovers? Bitter cynics? Perhaps another version 
of the academic subject needed. If we think this is the, we need to ask how might these new 
subjectivities might created? For instance, what kinds of socialisation processes might be 
needed instead of a stodgy diet of top tier journal articles, three paper theses and endless 
series of 'how to publish' workshops which PhD students currently subsist on?  
 
However, we think that the most pressing question is whether it is possible to think about 
academic work as not being a game. Maybe it is time to call 'game-over'. One simple step is 
to set up a charity fund in each department and charge five euros each time someone says 
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There are many cases of business schools sacrificing traditional activities (like teaching and 
research) to take on a wide range of apparently un-related roles. One UK business school offers a masterǯs programme which is specially designed for people who are un- or under-
employed. The programme mainly involved organizing internships for students. The hope 
was that it created some job-relevant training, fostered contacts with employers, and 
increased the likelihood of landing a job. All these things are of course laudable goals. The 
only issue is not that much higher education was involved. Students had to complete a 
report about their experience which was submitted as a Masters thesis. But in reality, the 
master programme was then basically a disguised job placement agency. Helping students 
with their job search is certainly a feature of higher education. But turning it into a major 
feature of their Master programme is another matter altogether. 
 
Another institution, which had an excellent reputation (because it was part of a top 
university), spent about a third of its teaching resources on preparing students for job 
applications and, in particular, job interviews. This meant that the graduates were very 
skilled in impression management and could negotiate a high salary. As official rankings are partly based on the graduatesǯ pay relatively soon after they qualify, this made it easier for 
the school to come out as a top provider of degrees in their field. And students willing to pay high fees could be recruited, since they could see that this was a ǲgood investmentǳ 
which really improved their career. When asked about this, the Dean could not see anything 
wrong with this strategy.   
 
Another business school prepared for a ranking based on an assessment of the research 
performed by removing some low-performing faculty from the website and temporarily 
moving others to units where their low research output was expected to do least harm.  
 
 
Instead of ensuring students are given a challenging and meaningful education, many 
universities have become increasingly focused on improving their ranking in various global 
lists of the best universities. To do this, they focus on producing a high output of articles 
which can be counted in various audit exercises. Usually putting much resources and 
energy into teaching is not prioritized.  
 
Education: making money and boosting credentials 
 
Developed countries often claim they have become knowledge societies. Any important part 
of this is widespread celebration of  higher education. The quantitative expansion of higher 
education is remarkable. Just 3.4% of young people in the UK went on to higher education 
in 1950. In 2011 that number was 49%. Other developed countries have seen similar 
massive quantitative expansions. In 1940, less than 5% of people had a college degree in the 
US. Today the number is over 20%. 35.7% of Europeans between the ages of 30 and 35 
have participated in higher education. University education has also globalized. In 2009, 
there were about 150 million university students in the world.     
 
As numbers have continued to expand, some suspect quality has suffered. Many students in 
today's universities seem to be there with little or no interest in the topics which they are 
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being taught. Attending lectures is largely a chance to check Facebook (Sorensen, 2014). In 
many cases, the subjects which are on offer are not exactly what one might hope as 
preparation for the kind of critical reasoning which universities are supposed to offer. 
Universities now offer classes on subjects like Beyoncé, David Beckham, Zombies and Star 
wars. While it might be easy to ignore a few quirky courses in Media studies degrees, what 
is more striking is the emergence of entire fields of study in areas which were once learned 
on the job in a few days. You can now take entire degree courses in bar tending. But what is 
most striking is that students actually seem to learn little while they are at university. One 
recent US study by Arum and Roksa (2011) of over 3000 undergraduate students at 29 
colleges found that after the first two years, 45% of students had showed no significant 
gains in learning. At the completion of their degree, after a full four years of study, 36% of 
students had learned little or nothing. In some cases, attending University pushed students 
backwards. Business students actually performed worse in their first few years o University 
than they had done in high school.  
 
The particularly poor performance of business schools in educating their students should 
come as no surprise. They are often cash cows by universities. They are seen as offering 
mass education with often questionable qualifications. One UK professor expressed this sentiment when he told us that Ǯan MBA from a British business school is not worth the paper of the degreeǯ. (e corrected this slighty, pointing at a few places being exceptions. But 
the implication seemed to be that in large majority of cases an MBA said little about the 
quality of the graduates. Lecturers in UK business schools often complain about the large 
number of oversee students they teach who have a poor knowledge and mastery of English. 
 
One would assume a functioning higher education systems would be characterized by 
reasonably high demands for admission, demanding content and examination and 
assessment which guarantees a high level of knowledge and ability. Exactly what this means 
is hard to say. But it is clear that a focus on the 'business' aspects of business school is much 
more pronounced than the 'school' aspects.  
 
Intellectual and occupational qualification – high volumes of intake and throughput, student 
satisfaction, and, above all, the generation of money to provide the university with a cash 
cow and fund high wages, good promotion possibilities and fringe benefits (like academic 
tourism in the form of sabbaticals, conference trips and other forms of academic tourism).  
 
UK business schools are, of course, not unique in partly sacrificing their original purpose 
and integrity for the benefit of scoring well in the rankings, thereby maximizing their 
visibility and status. In many places in the world, including the US, the ratio of teaching and 
administrative staff has changed significantly, and there are many posts that focus exclusively on facilitating studentsǯ careers, e.g. ǲCredential Specialist and Vice President for Student Successǳ ȋPiereson, ʹͲͳͳȌ. Much of this is directly focused on improving the studentǯs options in zero-sum games in the labour market. Parts of this is outside the range of academicsǯ control, but they ȋweȌ seem to accept a downgrading of meaning and purpose 
for material and status benefits and the comfort of adaptation and compliance, also with HE 
regimes alien to academic and professional ideals. 
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All this focus on ranking and careers may be fine from the point of view of the students who 
instrumentally benefit from this, but it means an intensifying of zero-sum games, since manipulating in order to improve rankings, boosting the studentsǯ CVs and preparing for 
job interviews does not add to job qualifications or the social good - only that someone may 
be better at getting ahead of others in the line of job applicants. All this adds nothing to 
what higher education is supposed to accomplish: people who can contribute with their 
intellectual skills and knowledge to their lives, jobs, and society as a whole, as good citizens. 
It only means that positional goods competition takes a purely Ǯnon-productiveǯ turn 
(Alvesson 2013). There is no benefit apart from the maximization of self-interest and positionality at the expense of others. When rankings and credentials are based on ǲtrueǳǯ 
performances, which are contingent upon the number of resources that have been used for 
teaching, salaries tend to be a better reflection of capacity. A degree from a specific 
institution then provides considerable information about the knowledge and intellectual 
quality of a graduate and fulfils a productive and valuable role. Position-competition based on ǲtrue qualityǳ is often valuable. Ambitious rankings that do not look at easily-
manipulated and misleading criteria, but at gained qualifications can be a productive force 
that improves teaching. But there are plenty of examples of clear deviations from this, 
leading to pure zero-sum games, where efforts to improve come at the direct expense of 
others, pushed further down in the job applicant line. Competition then drives not better 
performances, but better faking (e.g. CV boosting). While this can be blamed on government, university or school management or Ǯthe worldǯ, academics are the key group in universities and canǯt escape responsibility.  
 
Here are a few recent episodes that at least for a person with more traditional academic and 
intellectual orientations appear as highly surprising:  
 
1. Approaching a mid-career level colleague for participation in a joint book project 
lead the person to ask the mentor for advice. The mentor warned against writing 
book chapter as less good for the career and suggested concentrating on journal 
publication. The colleague, who earlier had expressed a strong interest in the 
collaboration, came back and indicated that s/he should probably not be able to 
participate in any other collaboration than journal publication. 
2. On the flight between two conferences – one of these was a CMS one – one of the 
authors met a  colleague and asked him about what he was working on. I had the 
intellectual project in mind, but he started by referring to names of the journals for 
which he was busy revising papers, then continued with referring to the UK 
Research Assessment Exercise, saying that he already had sufficient publications, but 
that he got extra rewards from the dean if he scored above what was needed. After 
all this he mentioned the content of the research work he was doing.  
3. )n a talk with a person with a senior position he complained about the Ǯhorribleǯ 
situation in UK, including pressure for publication, accept more students, etc. Asking 
about protests and/or perhaps writing about the situation triggered a more optimistic tone: Ǯwell if you have your Ͷ by Ͷ articles, then you can do what you want 
and it is not really that bad, actuallyǯ. 
 
There is now a rising feeling that published organizational research must change and 
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seek to say something socially relevant, to show concern for social problems and 
human suffering (Adler & Hansen, 2012) and/or to be relevant and actionable by 
managers and management students (Pearce & Huang, 2012). There are endless 
complaints of high status journals and what is accepted for publication, and as the 
experienced pressure is to primarily publish in these one would expect much 
resistance and non-compliance. 
 
Of course this is a complex set of issues, but the complaints that academics are more 
interested in getting published in the right outlets than having something relevant to 
say is noteworthy and can in part be attributed to strong compliance with regimes 
emphasizing onesidedly publications in highly ranked journals.  To publish in these 
are fine – but it is surprising to hear so many people having been discouraged from 
writing books or book chapters. One would perhaps assume that working with a 
variety of formats, being in line with different knowledge contributions, some of 
which would be best expressed in book-length texts, would be the overall norm. In 
particular, one would assume that support for innovative and influential research 
would be a top priority for most B schools. But pumping out journal papers seem to 
be the overall guideline, one to which the majority of academics subscribe, perhaps 
oversubscribe.   
 
 
. Many people seem to reason as if Gulag (disgrace or poverty) waited if a minor drop in 
journal publication output and/or ranking of the school would occur. But the 
material and symbolic effects of a change in ranking appear to be moderate, if not 
marginal. 
 
There are off the shelf explanations, e.g. the system is easy for deans to 
control/managerialism, market logic, new public management being triumphant, capitalism 
has defeated social democracy etc. Something more interesting and novel probably remains 
to be said. 
 
It is often claimed that it is difficult to manage professionals. Key characteristics are 
autonomy, self-goverenance, stronger loyalty and identification with the profession than 
with employers. Many managers have said that managing a professional service firm is like Ǯherding wild catsǯ ȋLöwendahl ͳͻͻ͹:͸͵Ȍ. A VC at a Swedish university some years ago gave a talk with some emotion emphasizing that Ǯthe organization need to be improved. We must make sure that decisions are implememented. )n canǯt be so any longer that decisions are treated as arguments in a debateǯ. )n a traditional university spirit, the latter attitude still 
tends to dominate at many places. One asks for good arguments, not for instructions for 
how to perform better in a measurement system. Most academics, even in B-schools, claim 
that they have a strong love for their vocation and work (Clarke et al 2012), implying a 
downgrading of instrumental orientations.  In the light of this and internationally 
communicated cultural ideals and expectations, the rather farreaching compliance in Uk 
business schools (and at other places as well) is of some interest to explore.  
 
Of course, the empirical picture is varied and there are plenty of examples of resistance 
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in one sense or another, including somewhat ironically publishing articles in top 
journals about the dangers of journal lists and journal publishing (e.g. Willmott 
2011). Still, there are still strong indications of a very high level of compliance 
amongst many people in key respects such as the downplaying of educational values for the boosting of CVǯs and job placement functions and, above all, giving a strong 
priority to doing and publishing research in ways that is prescribed and rewarded by 
their institutions, and then adjusting scholarly ambitions accordingly. One thing that 
is reasonable for an academic with time for research every 5th  year or so being able 
to demonstrate four good research contributions, another thing is that this leads to the acceptance of Ǯonly Ͷ star journal publications countǯ as a self-evident guideline. 
How can this be understood?  
 
There is a strong institutional/collective interest in making sure that all are contributing to 
the glory and status of the institution. Managerial and organizational peer pressure are then in harmony, making it difficult for the individual not to Ǯcontributeǯ. There is thus a 
collective, as much as managerial control, behind the use of coercive or first face power to 
accomplish compliance. 
 
It is here important also to bear in mind the political macro level, also feeding into 
everyday academic life and local decisions, in addition to what directly follows from 
assessment arrangements, rankings and resource allocation. Many countries, but 
perhaps within Europe UK in particular inhabits a polity in which in a broad sense 
neo-liberalism - and its managerialist handmaiden - has marginalised all other 
political discourses (social democratic, conservative) in a way that is less true of at 
least other European countries. This perhaps leads UK academics in particular to be 
resigned to having to compromise: all the battles have been lost, and they are not 
going to be won within university business schools. People disliking the changes probably often think that ǯWe know we are defeated and so we are quiescent from the startǯ. Defaitism in some respects rules and this legitimizes compliance and 
opportunism as it is viewed as stupid not to adapt and be realistic. Such a mega 
discourse then ideologically fuels into and strengthens the force of the machinery, 
viewed as very powerful. 
 
The fact that academics themselves seem to be supporting the 'research' agenda – as well as 
the  
 
The elements of cooptation are hard to resist: peer review both in journal publication 
and in the research assessments create and maintain a very strong concertive 
control effect (Barker 1993). A self-built prison may be more difficult to escape than 
one others have put you into. It is, on the whole, academics that have decided that 
these and these journals represent key outlets used as trustworthy indicators of high 
level research. 
 
There are some efforts to raise critical discussions, affecting the agenda, but often with 
an emphasis on moaning and groaning, with limited constructiveness. A problem is 
that with the heavy expansion of HE and the pressure of the institutions being 
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research based, there is an explosion of academics wanting to get published and, in 
order to meet the demand, a surplus of founding of new journals. Some kind of 
differentiation is probably unavoidable, to aid universities and research foundations 
in decisions of hiring, promoting, allocating research grants etc.   
 
 
The Business School environment also incorporate large groups of researchers socialized 
into technical or utlilitarian orientations such as financial economists. It is interesting to 
note that business schools has 
 
 – most notably a particular brand of economists. It is interesting to note that business 
schools have not always been  
 
Studies report that academics in economics are more inclined to maximize self-interest 
compared to their colleagues in humanities, social and natural sciences (Frank et al 1993). 
The overall setting is then dominated by subjectivities and norms advocating orientations 
responsive to instrumental rewards, forming cultural orientations and work logics also 
incorporating people with a strong Ǯlabour of loveǯ ȋClarke et al ʹͲͳʹȌ and perhaps inclined 
to develop less compromise-willing orientations in other academic contexts. ǮSelling outǯ as 
a strong anti-identity become weakened in favor of one being pragmatic and Ǯperform well 




In a sense all work performances and successes is connected back to personal qualities. 
However in academia, like in sports, the situation can be experience as more naked. 
In business, the contributions and results of individuals are seldom accomplished in 
splendid isolation but linked up in a web of complications, dependencies and 
collaborations. Choices are often limited. Results are often mainly contingent upon 
your industry, economic life-cycle, exchange rates and competitor moves than an individual employeeǯs or managerǯs brilliance. On the more local level, most people 
in business work together with a variety of people, units, etc and the outcome is 
often not easy to assess and can seldom easily be traced to one person (Jackall 
1988). 
 
A drawback with most easily available information in many knowledge-intensive 
contexts is its notorious unreliability. Numbers of results often say very little, 
particular in many non-commercial contexts, like social work, health care, education, 
making new public management difficult to operate effectively. In research numbers 
are, however, tightly tied with outcomes of peer assessments. This means that the 
key numbers carry a degree of credibility. People may resist journal lists, but on the 
whole it is difficult to deny that they are anchored in the entire peer assessment system and it is difficult to discredit oneǯs profession and its institutions, almost 
entirely self-governed. Few people would say that journal lists, less official rankings 
and citation scores are perfect, but on the whole they carry a fairly high level of 
credibility and are persuasive as they are simply reinforcing broadly accepted views 
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of journal quality.  Most people think that there is tendency that high level research 
work tend to be published in highly ranked journals and be quoted extensively. Even 
radical skeptics acknowledge that others take highly ranked seriously. 
 
Playing the game comes with risks such as having valued identities undermined. Being an 
instrumental cynic is bad as this would reducing commitment & motivation and lower chances of accomplishing something. )s it really possible to see oneǯs work as playing the 
game and then put in endless long working days into all the work? Given signs on 
commitment and great disappointment, even bitterness and anger, when the game does not 
end with a satisfactory outcome among many academics (also in tenured positions) 
indicates that the playing the game is not capturing the whole of what the RCRC is doing.  
 
An additional indicator of this game-playing being quite partial emerges from interviews of 
academics about their labour. Many people also express deep love and commitment to their 
work, claim to be very serious about teaching and research and come out as romantics 
more than cynical game-players (Clarke et al 2012).  
 
Of course it is possible that the game-players found by Butler & Spoelstra (2012) and the 
romantics that were interviewed by Clarke et al refer to different segments of the b school 
population, but it is perhaps more likely that roughly the same folks express different positions. There are then different possibilities. One being that the game players are Ǯreallyǯ romantics, another that the romantics are Ǯreallyǯ game players. The former would then only 
do marginal things to adapt to requirements, the latter would perhaps believe they are 
doing important work, while doing all the major moves in order to get published and then 
sacrifice the genuine commitment to an important cause during the process. 
 
Better is possibly to think about different elements or levels of gaming. Multi-level 
gaming or back and forth-positions are two options. These involve the 
foregrounding and backgrounding of different elements.  
 
Playing the game then can be viewed as something that (barely) masks another project: 
playing the game of playing the game. In other words, most academics are engaged in what 
they are doing, and feels quite serious about what they are doing. But this feeling of 
commitment and romanticism can be distorted by the strong elements of control and 
instrumentalism. People can be both pushed and seduced into the corresponding subject 
position. This can lead to a degree of unease. Playing the game idea offers some aid in the 
regulation of all this. Occassionally people may be quite cynical and be Ǯreallyǯ into playing 
the game. But when this happesn, they loose sight of meta-play, i.e. playing or pretending 
that they are (only) playing the game. Through meta-play they can resist (they like to think) 
and can use this as an excuse for being sucked into the work and comply (Fleming & Spicer 
2003; Kunda 1992). They are cynical and can thus avoid the pain and costs of following any 
urge to resistance. But after all they are compliant and reproduce and reinforce (exploit and 





and incentives has played a role 
 
 
Simple explanations, such as the strength of the managerialist regime, seem insufficient. 
Minimally, one can add that a more fine-tuned understanding of the rather high level of 
compliance can lead to additional insights to broad-brushed explanations.  
 
Broadly, the following ingredients seem to have brought strong adaption and compliance in 
(UK) b schools: 
  The business school environment: there is selective recruitment and socialisation into material forms of selfishness/money, meaning that the inclination of Ǯselling outǯ 
(traditional ideals of scholarship) is more pronounced than in other areas  Seductiveness of excellence and appeal, competition and ranking triggering a lust to compete and compare and show oneǯs worth   Rationality of performance measurement – the irresistibility of the peer review, 
being legitimate   Effective surveillence system provided by modern technology, making performance 
highly visible, creating a strong class cage effect   The material rewards involved in commercially oriented B schools with high scores 
on research output, high ranking leads to affluence of resources leading to quick 
promotion and high wages.  
 
Although these points may give us the broader picture a more finetuned understanding 
calls for how individuals and groups operate in a context where the complaints about the 
system and changes are abundent and any strong sense of scholarship would call for protests and resistance. One could say that a Ǯrealǯ scholar is very disinclined to adapt to a Ͷ 
by 4 success formular, in particular when there is a rather negative view of what the 
journals publish.  Of course this is not to say that the demand of demonstrating research 
output of high quality is unreasonable, but it could be in the form of books or a single 
contribution that is outstanding – something that academics today seldom seems to try, as 
they prefer modest and safe work with predictable outcomes (Courpasson 2013).  
 
One way of understand this is the point at four major subject positions: resisting 
compliant romantic-cynic (RCRC). Contemporary academic cultures suggest some 
mastery and use of all of these. Identity constructing processes aiming to preserve a 
strong sense of scholarly self with a high level of prescribed performance calls for 
smoothness. One important resource here is the  
 
The only problem however is that most academics are probably rather serious about 
their work. Often they talk about it as labour of love. To deal with this simultanous 
closeness and distance, meta-play is important. One plays as if it is matter of game-
playing. It is often quite serious work, there are strong feelings associated it. In order 
to deal with this serious side but also give some flexibility to move in and out of the 
game playing, meta-play is needed. This moving between the resister, the romantic, 
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the compliant and the cynic. Through combining and decoupling these subject 
positions, game playing allows individual academics to justify to oneself a high level 
of compliance and a loss of professional autonomy.  
